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PRE-REVOLUTIONARY POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
LARRY KRAMER'S THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES
RICHARD

J. ROss*

Because my expertise is in early American history, I will concentrate
on Larry Kramer's portrait of pre-Revolutionary popular constitutionalism,
which acts as a baseline against which to measure nineteenth-century developments. Before examining pre-Revolutionary constitutionalism, however, I want to note two features of Kramer's style of historical argument
that make the book a particularly sophisticated treatment of its subject.
1.

A.

STYLE OF ARGUMENT

Kramer Employs ContrapuntalRather Than Strictly Contextual
Analysis

Historians often explain one thing by reference to a second, which
forms the context or background for the first thing. A historian might treat
judicial review as a practice that evolved within the context of popular
constitutionalism. In this approach, judicial review would be the object to
be explained, and popular constitutionalism would be the background or
context. But Kramer's approach is not just contextual in this way. It is contrapuntal. I say "contrapuntal" because judicial review and popular constitutionalism each stand, at different points in the book, as objects to be
explained and as backgrounds or contexts for the other's evolution. Both
serve not only as contexts, but as challenges to the other. Each provokes
intellectual and political changes to the other which, in the process, alters
both. The contrapuntal engagement of judicial review and popular constitutionalism is not only the subject of the book, but it is also an engine that
drives change.
B.

KramerPursues a Social History of Constitutionalism

Kramer does not just show changing constitutional and political positions and the tensions between them. He continually asks what makes a
* University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign) College of Law and History Department.
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particular position plausible and salient. What were the social, intellectual,
and political preconditions for its emergence? The book is a social history
of constitutional ideas insofar as it inquires into the conditions for the reception and flourishing of a particular position. The book is ingenious in
pointing to developments that served as background conditions facilitating
changes in judicial review decades later. An example would be Kramer's
analysis in Chapter 6 of how the growing assimilation of constitutional law
into ordinary law laid the groundwork for those who would, years later,
advocate judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation. 1

II. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONALISM
Kramer's portrait of pre-Revolutionary constitutionalism is built on
two dichotomies that are valuable yet exclude middle positions.
A.

DistinctionBetween FundamentalLaw and OrdinaryLaw

Kramer's reconstruction of pre-Revolutionary popular constitutionalism claims that fundamental law, interpreted by the people, regulated the
government, while ordinary law made by the government regulated the
people. Yet there was a middle position. Ordinary law regulated the people
but also was a part of the constitutional regulation of government. Eighteenth-century colonists restrained their rulers by insisting that the government act according to established procedures, or impose preexisting rules
and sanctions. The minutiae of standing law and "due process," which were
in the first instance created by government, became a restraint on governmental activity.
There is another problem with Kramer's sharp distinction between the
law regulating the people and the law regulating the government, a problem
that David Konig suggested to me in conversation. What does it mean for
"the government" to enforce ordinary law in colonial America when unpaid
amateurs conducted nearly all law enforcement? When a cobbler acting as
a constable for a year executed or quietly ignored an order issued by a tobacco planter acting as a justice of the peace for a year, did "the government" act or did "the people" act? In a colonial system where professional
legal interpreters and enforcers were so rare, and where the overlap of state
and society was so profound, can one maintain a distinction between ordinary law by which government regulates the people and fundamental law
by which people regulate the government?
1. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-69 (2004).
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B. DistinctionBetween Judges as Supreme Constitutional
Authorities and Judges as No More Authoritative Than Other
ConstitutionalInterpreters
Kramer argues that the middle eighteenth-century Anglo-America
constitutional tradition assumed that the constitution was a species of "law"
yet judges had no "special role in determining its meaning."'2 This formulation admits of two possibilities: either (a) judges are supreme constitutional
interpreters; or (b) judges had no "special role" in determining the constitution's meaning. Kramer's quite proper rejection of judicial supremacy in
the pre-Revolutionary Anglo-American constitutional order does not mean
that option (b) is correct. There was a middle position. Consider the importance in Anglo-American constitutionalism of great cases decided by
judges, such as, to pick a few, Calvin's Case,3 cases on taxation and pre4
rogative before the English Civil War, Bushnell's Case on jury coercion,
cases that determined the reach of English statutes and common law into
the American colonies, and so forth. These decisions had a "special role" in
Anglo-American constitutionalism and became fixed points that other actors felt compelled to address. Debates centered on the interpretation of
these judicial landmarks because they could not be ignored or brushed
aside. Judges who sat on high tribunals, though not supreme, were honored
and particularly important constitutional interpreters. They were not supreme, but they had a special role that elevated them above Privy Councilors, royal governors, members of Parliament, and colonial assemblymen,
let alone justices of the peace, customs collectors, and other low-level constitutional interpreters.

III. WHAT IS

AT STAKE IN REVISING KRAMER'S PICTURE OF

PRE-

REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONALISM

What is at stake in complicating Kramer's two sets of strong distinctions and in emphasizing middle positions-emphasizing, that is, the centrality of ordinary law in constitutional restraint of government and the
authoritativeness, though not utter supremacy, of judges?

2. Id.
at 24.
3. (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.).
4. (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. i006 (C.P.).
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How Pre-RevolutionaryConstitutionalismFunctionedat Ground
Level

Kramer insightfully points out that significant popular input into preRevolutionary constitutional decision-making would, to modem eyes, suggest instability in the system. How, then, did it work for so long? He gives
two explanations, which are helpful, but incomplete.
Kramer'sfirst explanation: There were limited opportunities for constitutional conflict given the modest role of colonial government. But, pervasive uncertainties in the colonies' domestic constitutions and the imperial
constitution meant that low-level conflicts (over such things as custom
service rules, support for the clergy, juror selection, and so forth) kept spiraling into grand constitutional controversies.
Kramer's second explanation: The deference and dependency of
common people put a damper on constitutional disputes. But, many constitutional disputes involved different factions of the elites. Elite groups in
conflict could not mobilize deference and dependency to restrain each other
as they could to quiet down the middling and lower sort.
Here's where the "middle positions" overlooked in Kramer's dichotomies come in handy. They suggest mechanisms for steadying the preRevolutionary constitutional order at ground level. The mass of quotidian
ordinary law and procedure developing in the colonies over the eighteenth
century, which was part of the colonial constitutions, acted as a stabilizing
force. The special role of judges did likewise by restraining the centrifugal
dangers of polities suffused with so many constitutional interpreters.
There is a further reason to emphasize the importance in ground-level
constitutionalism of ordinary law and the special role of judges: the "people
at large" that do so much work in Kramer's pre-Revolutionary popular
constitutionalism do not seem all that well-suited to the task. This is not
clear in the first chapter of the book, where Kramer artfully lays out his
vision of robust popular constitutionalism. 5 For me, doubts began to arise
in Chapter 4.6 At this point, Kramer's nicely demonstrates how early national judicial review could be accommodated to an emerging democratic
public sphere and the valorization of public opinion, to the decline of deference in politics, and to a new self-confidence by the common people in
their political and constitutional judgments. Here we see the formation of a
public immersed in newspapers, debating societies, political parties, and
politically-expressive celebrations. Yet if the capability of the people to act
5. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 9-34.
6. Id. at 93-127.
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as constitutional monitors grew so dramatically in the early national period,
how did the people discharge their responsibilities in the robust popular
constitutionalism that Kramer finds before the Revolution? The downward
estimation in the skill, education, and confidence of the mid-eighteenthcentury populace that results when one considers the growing knowledge
and legal sophistication of the early national populace underscores how
important were ordinary law and judicial authority in the practical functioning of colonial constitutionalism.
B.

Periodizationand What Needs to Be Explained

The second thing at stake in revising Kramer's portrait of preRevolutionary constitutionalism is that one then receives a different understanding of periodization. Kramer importantly emphasizes that in the
1830s, advocates of the departmental view of judicial review (like James
Madison) began to concede to the judiciary priority (though still not supremacy) in constitutional interpretation. Given Kramer's depiction of
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century history, this turn in the
1830s appears as a departure from the vigorous attachment to popular constitutionalism held by almost all except the high Federalist fringe. But if
one sketches pre-Revolutionary constitutionalism in the ways I suggested,
Madison's turn in the 1830s is not a novelty but an allusion in a different
context to pre-Revolutionary practices of honoring judicial interpretations
of constitutional issues as authoritative and important (if not supreme).
Changing our accounts of pre-Revolutionary constitutionalism changes our
perception of critical questions: What is anomalous? What calls out for
explanation? In Kramer's formulation, the turn by Madison and others
away from a dominant eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century
robust theory of popular constitutionalism is an anomaly that needs explanation. In my view, the turn in the 1830s has important similarities with
pre-Revolutionary Anglo-American constitutionalism. The modest judicial
authority over constitutional judgments in the period between the Revolution and 1830 stands out as anomalous, as the thing needing explanation.
CONCLUSION

I have concentrated on pre-Revolutionary constitutionalism because
that is what I know something about. The danger is that I am like the man
who is asked to describe an elephant and speaks for fifteen minutes about
the animal's feet because the man happens to be a podiatrist and finds feet
interesting. Let me end by looking upwards from the feet to the elephant as
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a whole. The book as a whole is a major achievement. It problematizes the
post-Cooper v. Aaron constitutional order by exploring the historical relationship of judicial review and popular constitutionalism in a contrapuntal
fashion and through a social history of constitutionalism that continually
asked what political and intellectual conditions made arguments plausible
and salient.

